THE INFLUENCE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR CHARACTERISTICS ON TAX MANAGEMENT

Fernando¹, Oktavia², Hartoni³
¹,²,³ Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis, Universitas Kristen Krida Wacana, Jakarta, Indonesia
Email Korespondensi: oktavia@ukrida.ac.id

Abstract: The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of characteristics based on gender, ownership, and financial educational background of independent directors as part of the corporate governance organs on tax management in the basic materials sector of companies, industry, consumer cycles, and non-consumer cycles in Indonesia. This research uses quantitative methods. The sampling method in this study used a purposive sampling method. The data taken in the annual report is in the form of company financial data for 2019-2021 on the IDX by conducting content analysis to obtain profiles of independent directors. The study used multiple linear regression analysis with unbalanced panel data and REM approach. Based on the tests conducted, gender and years of service have no significant effect on tax management. Meanwhile, the financial education background of independent directors has a significant positive effect on tax management. This research has several limitations. First, this research only focuses on certain sectors. Second, the measurement of the independent director's financial background education variable is only based on the information reported in the annual report, so it can cause bias if background education information is not reported in the annual report.

Keywords: Gender, Tenure, Financial Education Background, Tax Management, Independent Director

1. INTRODUCTION

In Indonesia, tax is the revenue that makes the largest contribution. On average in 2019-2021, tax realization contributed 79% of the overall state revenue. Reflecting on this, the state must ensure as much revenue as possible. Companies are obliged to pay taxes in addition to individuals. Based on their size, companies pay more than individuals, but companies as taxpayers certainly always strive for cost efficiency, one of which is to minimize their tax payments through tax avoidance activities. Tax avoidance efforts to save tax payments are allowed by the government, as long as the actions taken do not violate applicable tax regulations. As seen from the Panama Papers case that occurred in 2016, the tax evasion case be a warning of the need to reorganize corporate governance that contains the value of professionalism, transparency, and responsibility for the tax system that we have. Tax management is related to corporate governance, where the results obtained from tax management directly impact the interests of shareholders (Chen et al., 2018); therefore, the board of directors plays an important role in carrying out tax
management strategies. This is in line with the research conducted by Manurung and Krisnawati (2018), who explains that directors affect tax management.

As the management of the company, the management and its board have the duty to make the best use of the resources the company has so that the company’s performance can be improved effectively and efficiently. (Syofyan, 2021). Tax management is a way that companies use resource efficiency to save on tax payments. (Carolina, 2017). Tax management is a means of fulfilling tax obligations in accordance with applicable regulations, but the amount paid may be pressured to be as low as possible to obtain the expected profit and liquidity. (Suandy, 2017).

In the implementation of good corporate governance, the administrative structure in Indonesia is divided into two parts, namely directors and commissioners. (Supriatna and Ermond, 2019) The management of the company serves as decision-makers and executives, while the commissioner serves to oversee the performance of the board of directors while representing the interests of shareholders. In addition, on both sides, there are independent parties assigned as supervisors while representing the interests of minority shareholders. The supervision carried out by the independent director and the independent commissioner is assisted by the audit committee so that the decisions taken by the company’s executive board do not harm the interests of shareholders. Independent corporate governing bodies such as independent directors, independent commissioners, and audit committees have members who are not affiliated with board members, commissioners, or controlling shareholders and have no business relationship that could affect their ability to act independently. With the presence of independent bodies in the company, the interests of majority and minority shareholders can be carried out fairly. Independent bodies are expected to act as arbitrators who can be balanced against decisions made by majority shareholders so that the interests of minority shareholders cannot be ignored. (Rifai, 2009).

Gender can also be an influential factor in tax management. In general, men are associated with a firm figure and women with a friendly and understanding figure. (Sovitriana, 2019). If the stereotype is depicted in the independence of a person in overseeing management performance in a company, then the male figure in independent oversight is considered more effective as the supervisor of management because it is known to be more firm and bold in defying or giving instructions or warnings if the management makes aggressive decisions that are considered to harm the interests of shareholders. Women are considered less effective in supervision because of their emotional and gentle character in the face of aggressive decisions taken by the management, so the support provided is not considered maximum in protecting the interests of shareholders. Less strict surveillance can make the company’s aggressiveness in tax management uncontrolled, which, as far as it is concerned, leads to tax evasion. If so, then the value of the company will be damaged in the public eye. Therefore, the gender consideration of an independent body in supervision to ensure the company runs properly is of paramount importance.

Another factor that can influence tax management is the tenure of directors. Anjani (2019), in Gustiana et al. (2021), explains that periods of office held by independent bodies can provide experience, increased competence, and a greater sense of
responsibility. Thus, the longer the tenure of the independent management, the greater its expertise and experience in detecting fraud committed by management. Therefore, the longer an independent director has tenure, the lower the corporate tax aggressiveness.

Independent directors who have a financial or tax education background are more competent in overseeing activities and examining the validity of management decisions related to the management of profits or corporate tax management. This is because those who have already taken related education have broader insights, so they are more competent in over-aggressive tax activities that could harm the interests of shareholders in the future. Therefore, educational backgrounds owned by independent directors influence reducing corporate tax aggressiveness.

Based on the above description, the authors are interested in testing the influence of gender, tenure, and financial education backgrounds of independent directors on corporate tax management. This study was conducted on the basis of research carried out by Oktaviani et al. (2022) with some differences that distinguish this study from previous research, i.e., the information taken has a different period, where the researchers used the latest information, which is the period 2019–2021, researchers added one independent variable in the research, which is the gender obtained from the previous research conducted by Astutik and Venusita (2020), this study was done taking into account the independent attitude of a director (Supriatna and Edmond, 2019), and the sample taken from the information of the company's governing bodies will later only sample independent directors. It is also stated by the KNKG (2022) in the General Guidelines of Governance of the Public Sector of Indonesia (PUGSPI) that the independent director, as part of the monitoring mechanism within the company, serves as an unaffiliated party and also as a control tool of the company to coordinate the actions of agents with the principle interest and reduce the occurrence of information asymmetry so that the application of the principles of corporate governance is done well and the agents or executives can act in accordance with the interests of the principle or shareholders.

It is hoped that this research can add insights into the link between corporate governance and tax avoidance practices in a more comprehensive way. This research is also expected to be a reference for future researchers interested in studying this topic. Furthermore, the study is expected to provide insights into the role of the independent director in monitoring the tax management activities carried out by the company and can provide an insight into the importance of the existence of an independent corporate governing body (in this case, an independent director) in overseeing the management of the company so as not to engage in too aggressive and detrimental tax management activities to stakeholders.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Agency Theory

The agency theory is the basis of the contractual relationship between the principal and the agent. The principal is the shareholder of a company that gives duties and authority, while the agent is the management or employee of the company who receives duties or authority. In companies, there is usually a difference of interest between agents and principles. If there is a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, then an
agency conflict can occur. According to Ardy and Kristanto (2015), agency conflicts can also occur between taxpayers (companies) and the government. In this case, the government is described as the principal and the taxpayer (the company) as an agent. This difference exists because the government wants the taxpayer as an agent to obey the tax regulations and pay taxes regardless of the amount of value to the country, while the company as a taxpayer wants to pay the minimum tax possible. This can be achieved, supported by the tax system in Indonesia, as a self-assessment system that gives the corporate taxpayer the authority to calculate their own taxes. Agents can take advantage of this opportunity to manipulate taxable income to become smaller, so they can minimize the value of taxes paid. (Ardyansyah, 2014).

Tax Management

Tax management is the process of planning, managing, and regulating the tax burden that will be borne by the company. (Yuniati et al., 2017). According to Suandy (2017), tax management is an attempt to reduce or minimize the tax burden to be paid so that the tax paid does not exceed the actual amount. This practice is carried out by the management while still complying with applicable legal rules. Legal means tax savings are made using things that are not regulated by the law so that there are no violations of applicable rules. The driving factor for companies to conduct tax management is that, on the part of the company, the tax is seen as a burden. An excessive burden can affect the return to shareholders as well as the size of the small compensation that will be received by the management.

Corporate Governance

According to Kusmayadi et al. (2015), corporate governance is a set of processes that are used structurally in managing and leading a business with the aim of increasing the company’s values and ensuring its survival of the company. When associated with the corporate context, corporate governance is an effective and efficient organization based on a solid and responsible synergy of interaction between bodies within the company and society. (Syofyan, 2021). Good corporate governance is commonly referred to as good corporate governance, which is understood as a good system of government or company. According to Kusmayadi et al. (2015), good corporate governance is a corporate management system designed to protect the interests of shareholders, improve the performance of the company, and improve compliance with the regulations of applicable laws in general.

The management of limited enterprises in Indonesia is regulated by using a two-tier system where, in the management structure of the company, there are two separate membership sections: the board of commissioners serves as supervisors and the board of directors serves as the company's executive. KNKG explains that the Board of Commissioners is responsible for overseeing and advising the company's directors and ensuring that the company implements the GCG. The board of directors is a party within a company entity that serves as the company's manager.

According to Supriatna and Edmond (2019), the guidelines issued by the KNKG encourage the implementation of the principles of good corporate governance. At the
moment, the company knows not only the existence of independent commissioners, audit committees, and company secretaries but also the independent directors who sit in the management of the company. The existence of an independent director has the function of ensuring that each board of directors performs its respective roles responsibly and objectively. The existence of an independent director is expected as an additional check and balance in a company that ensures that each board of directors performs its respective roles responsibly. Surya and Yustiavandana (2006), in their book, argue that the terms independent commissioner and independent director are basically the same. The difference in terms is due to the differences between the two corporate legal systems. The legal system that adopts the one-tier system has a board of directors; in this system, the term independent director refers to the body that oversees the performance of the board. In the two-tier system, there are two separate bodies within a management system, namely, the Board of Directors and the Council of Commissioners. Through the General Guidelines of the Government of the Public Sector of Indonesia (PUGSPI) by the KNKG (2022), the application of the principles of corporate governance should be done well so that agents or executives can act in accordance with the interests of the principal or shareholders, independent directors, and independent commissioners as part of the monitoring mechanism within the company function as non-affiliated parties and also as a control tool of the company to coordinate the actions of agents with the principal interests as well as reduce the occurrence of information asymmetry. Based on the above exposure, it can be concluded that the independent director is the party not affiliated with the shareholders, members of the board of directors, and/or other board of commissioners who can independently oversee the performance of the executive board and judge objectively.

According to Supriatna and Edmond (2019), the guidelines issued by the KNKG encourage the implementation of the principles of good corporate governance. At present, the company has not only independent commissioners, audit committees, and company secretaries but also independent directors who are in the management of the company. The existence of an independent director has the function of ensuring that each board of directors performs its duties responsibly and objectively. The existence of an independent director is expected as an additional check and balance in a company that ensures that each board of directors performs its respective roles responsibly.

According to Sahadi et al. (2020), character is a reflection of the potential from within and an understanding of the moral values from outside that are part of his personality. Characteristics are the things that each person possesses in the form of interests and attitudes that he or she brings into his or her environment. According to Sahadi et al. (2020), character in corporate organs is one of the key determinants of the success of an organization. The character of a good corporate body can make the direction the organization takes more clearly align with the objectives to be achieved. In decision-making, it is important to have a corporate body that has characteristics such as experience and proven quality education because they have an influence on the decision-making strategies taken by the company body. (Musso dan Francioni, 2012).

According to Astutic and Venusita (2020), in terms of taking risks, men and women have different preferences. Men tend to be braver to take risks compared to
women, who are more considerate or avoid them. Novita (2016) explains that in the executive ranks, a woman and a man can make different decisions. In doing tax planning, men tend to take more risks in finding gaps in tax rules, while women tend to be more obedient to tax regulations. It can be concluded that, based on the research shown above, male executives are more aggressive in conducting tax management than women. Excessively aggressive management can lead to tax breaches, so to prevent the occurrence of violations, it is necessary to have independent commissioners, independent directions, and audit committees serving as executive performance supervisors. As an executive performance supervisor, the gender of a supervisory board can influence the tax management of a company. According to Kurnia et al. (2019), the existence of a firm independent director is necessary to curb the actions of male gender management known as a risk-taker and detect fraud committed by directors who exploit their position by aggressively conducting tax avoidance practices for their personal gain. Through the above illustration, I can formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: The gender of independent directors influences tax management.

According to a study conducted by Oktavia et al. (2022), the tenure of a board of directors has a positive influence on tax aggressiveness. This is because a person’s experience affects the basis of one’s decision-making. So if the person has a long tenure, it can be said to have often made a decision. Then, a manager becomes more expert at taking risky decisions. However, this is different from the existence of supervisors aimed at protecting shareholders. According to Purnomo and Eriandani (2022), audit committees as part of independent bodies have a negative impact on tax avoidance. A long-term audit committee can make its oversight effective so that tax avoidance is reduced. Based on the above, I can formulate the following hypothesis:
H2: An independent director’s tenure influences tax management.

According to Oktaviani et al. (2022), financial, accounting, and tax education taken by the board of directors has a negative impact. According to the research conducted by Aliani (2014), the insight that the management has reduced its aggressiveness in decision-making is due to the insight that it has made the management take into account the risk factors caused by its decision to avoid taxes. With the maximum supervision of an independent commissioner or director and an audit committee, the company can become more tax compliant. (Fadilah et al., 2021). Based on the above, I can formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: Financial Education Background: Independent Director Influential on Tax Management.

3. RESEARCH METHODS
The form of research used in this research is quantitative, using secondary data as a data source. The secondary data used in this research is a company’s financial report that contains company and company financial information taken from the Indonesia Stock Exchange website (www.idx.co.id). The population in this study is companies in the basic materials, industrial, consumer cyclical, and consumer non-cyclical sectors, where, according to the researchers, the sector is dominated by the manufacturer/manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in the period 2019–2021, so the
results obtained from the research focused on the manufacturing sector. The sampling method is purposive sampling. The data obtained in the observation is the analysis of the content of the company's information so as to obtain data in the form of an independent director's profile. Statistical analysis using Eviews software. The analysis technique used in this study is a double-linear regression analysis. Here are the models used in this study:

\[
MP_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DGEN_{it} + \beta_2 TEN_{it} + \beta_3 EDU_{it} + \beta_4 SIZE_{it} + \beta_5 PROF_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]  

\( MP_{it} \)  Tax management is measured from the tax burden divided by profits before corporate tax \( i \) in the year \( t \).

\( DGEN_{it} \)  Variable dummy gender director independent company \( i \) in the year \( t \) (1 for the majority of independent directors are male, 0 otherwise).

\( TEN_{it} \)  The average tenure of the position of independent director of the company \( i \) in the year \( t \).

\( EDU_{it} \)  Ratio financial education background independent director of the company \( i \) in the year \( t \).

\( SIZE_{it} \)  The natural logarithm of the total assets of the company in the year \( t \).

\( PROF_{it} \)  Profitability of the company’s return on assets in the year

\( \epsilon_{it} \)  The error of company term \( i \) in year \( t \).

Based on Table I, the number of samples obtained is 196 observation data from a total of 103 companies.

### Table I.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampling Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion 1: Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2019- 2021 (403 companies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion 2: The company publishes annual reports ending December 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion 3: The company earned profits during the study period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion 4: The company has a complete profile of independent directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample (103 companies)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data processed through Microsoft Excel (2023)

Gender is a difference in roles that are divided into men and women. The company size proxy used refers to a study conducted by Astutik and Venusita (2020) that uses a dummy variable by giving a value of 1 to a company whose composition of independent directors is majority male and a value of 0 for others. Tenure is the period of time indicating the age of the person who occupies the position. The proxy used in measuring tenure in this study refers to a study that has been conducted by Oktaviani et al. (2022) that uses an average long-working independent director serving as an independent director. Education background is the background on education taken by a person. The
proxy used in measuring the financial education background in this study refers to research conducted by Adnan et al. (2016) that uses the proportion of the number of independent directors who take up education related to finance, accounting, or taxation as follows:

\[ EDU = \frac{\text{Number of Independent Directors According to Criteria}}{\text{Total Independent Director}} \]

This study uses control variables such as company size and profitability. The size of a company is a measure of the amount of wealth a company owns. The company’s proxy size as a control variable in this study refers to the study conducted by Fahreza (2017):

\[ \text{Size} = \ln (\text{Total Asset}) \]

Profitability is a measure of the efficiency of capital use performed by a company by comparing the total assets with the net profit obtained by the company. (Dewi et al., 2022). Proxy profitability is used as a control variable in this study as follows:

\[ ROA = \frac{\text{Earnings after tax}}{\text{Total Asset}} \]

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table II. Descriptive Statistic Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0.274018</td>
<td>0.962060</td>
<td>0.003522</td>
<td>0.153984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGEN</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0.846939</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.360969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>4.959184</td>
<td>16.00000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>3.223451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0.622449</td>
<td>16.00000</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.480711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>28.52593</td>
<td>32.51282</td>
<td>25.31018</td>
<td>1.395266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROF</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0.062586</td>
<td>0.363620</td>
<td>0.000417</td>
<td>0.058465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data processed through Eviews 10 (2023)

Descriptions: MP = Tax Management, DGEN = Gender (Dummy), TEN = Tenure, EDU = Financial Education Background, SIZE = Size of a company, PROF = Profitability

Data Model Test Result

Panel data model testing is carried out to find the panel data estimate model that matches the research. Based on panel data model testing using Eviews 10, the Chow test found that Fixed Effect was a better model compared to Pooled Least Square (PLS). However, when Hausman tested by comparing fixed effect with random effect, it could be concluded that the Random Effect Model (REM) is a correct model and suitable for use in this study.

Classical Assumptions Test

The classical assumption tests used in this study are the normality test and the multicollinearity test. In the normality test, all study variables have prob values <0.05, so it can be concluded that the study sample is not distributed normally. In the multicollinearity test, no problem was found for any independent variable in the study, as
demonstrated by meeting the condition of non-multicollinearity: VIF value < 10 and tolerance value > 0.1.

**Hypothesis Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.625371</td>
<td>0.110517</td>
<td>5.658593</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGEN</td>
<td>0.002565</td>
<td>0.013529</td>
<td>0.189626</td>
<td>0.849800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN</td>
<td>-0.002523</td>
<td>0.003774</td>
<td>-0.668534</td>
<td>0.504600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>0.038745</td>
<td>0.018156</td>
<td>2.134039</td>
<td>0.034100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>-0.011069</td>
<td>0.003129</td>
<td>-3.536979</td>
<td>0.000500*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROF</td>
<td>-0.788711</td>
<td>0.197647</td>
<td>-3.990513</td>
<td>0.000100*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table III, the determination coefficient (R-squared) value obtained is 0.107685, or 10.8%, and the adjusted R-square value is 0.084203, or 8.4%. If you look at the adjusted R-squared value, it can be concluded that the variables gender, tenure, and financial education background of independent directors, as well as size and profitability, have an impact of 8.4% on tax management. The remaining 91.6% were influenced by other variables outside of this study. The value obtained from the hypothesis test results shows a prob (F-statistic) value of 0.000567. If the value of the obtained level of significance is 0.05, then it can be concluded that the independent variable has a significant influence on tax management, and regression models can be said to be appropriate for use in research.

Based on the partial test results obtained in Table III, it can be concluded that the independent variable used in the study of gender, the tenure of the independent director, could not have an influence on management, while the variable financial education background of the independent director had a significant positive impact with a sig. value of 0.0341 and a coefficient value of 0.038745.

In the control variable testing, SIZE and PROF proved to have a significant negative impact on tax management. Negative size indicates that the increasing size of the company has a negative impact on tax management because companies with large amounts of assets are not yet able to perform tax management properly. Profitability has a negative impact, indicating that the greater the profit obtained by the company, the less tax management is carried out because the imposition of taxes will increase as the company's profits increase.
The Effect of Gender on Tax Management

According to the gender test results, independent directors influence tax management. This means that the gender variable of independent directors partially has no influence on tax management. It can be concluded that, through this study seen from the supervisory side, the gender of the independent directors as the regulatory body, both male and female, does not affect the tax management carried out by a company. The psychological side proposed by Sovitriana (2019) about the more courageous men and the more gentlewomen does not apply to the role of an independent director as a supervisor because there are other things such as professional attitudes, principles, and other factors that a person possesses in serving as an independent supervisor in particular so that this gender has not been able to explain the close connection to corporate tax management. If seen in agency theory, the difference of interest only occurs between the principal and the agent. This may explain why gender differences in the positions occupying the position of independent director do not affect a person’s goals as an independent director who has a duty to monitor the activity of the company and prevent management actions that could potentially harm the company, in particular shareholders. The results of this study are inconsistent with Sofianty et al. (2022), Novita (2016), Liu et al. (2019), Budiana, and Kusuma (2018), who researched from the gender executive side of a board of directors and found that the presence of male gender in the board has a negative impact on tax administration, while gender diversity through the existence of women has a positive impact on tax management. This study is consistent with Kurnia (2018), which found that the existence of independent directors had no influence on tax aggressiveness. The study was conducted by Astutik and Venusita (2020), Aliani (2014), and Hariyanto (2018), which found no influence of the gender variable of an independent director in overseeing management performance, in particular in tax management.

Effect of Tenure on Tax Management

Based on the results of the tenure test of independent directors influencing tax management, the variable tenure of the independent director partially has no influence on tax management. Of course, we need to consider the experience and training gained by a person because the long or short term of an independent director serving as a company does not reflect the experiences and expertise they have acquired in the past. This study is inconsistent with Astutik and Venusita (2020) and Oktaviani et al. (2022), which obtained different results where the tenure of the director as an executive has a positive influence, whereas, in the results of this research, the tenure of the independent director as a supervisor has no significant influence on tax management. This is in line with research conducted by Aliani (2014) and Hariyanto (2018) that investigated the tenure of directors, as executives had no influence on tax aggressiveness.

The Effect of Financial Education Background on Tax Management

Based on the results of the financial education background test, independent directors have an influence on tax management because the test results show that there is a significant positive influence of the independent director's financial education background on tax management. Based on the results, it can be concluded that the
existence of independent directors who have an education related to finance, accounting, and taxation cannot suppress tax management in the company but rather support the executive director in carrying out tax management or tax aggressiveness. Based on this, it can be said that the role of the independent director and the executive director is not different; both act as agents where there are other factors that support the actions of the company in carrying out tax management. In fact, this was supported by the decision of the Board of Directors of the Indonesian Stock Exchange No. KE-00183 BEI/12-2018 Regarding Changes in Regulations Number I-A on the Listing of Shares and Equity Effects Beyond Shares, where the company is not required to have an independent director in the corporate governing body. It has been widely referenced by many companies in this sample research to eliminate the positions of independent directors in 2019 and give a full discharge of responsibility for all management and supervision actions during the term of office as long as such actions are reflected in the staff books. Based on the explanation above, the existence of independent directors who are educated in finance, accounting, and taxation in the company does not have the expected impact. This is marked by the results of research that find that tax management cannot be infiltrated, in addition to the decision of the Indonesian Stock Exchange that is followed by many companies in removing the position of independent director in their company. This indicates the goal of the company, which wants to create an effective governing body by improving the efficiency of its corporate organs. The results of this study are different from previous studies. This is not in line with the research conducted by Astutik and Venusita (2020), where the education of directors as executives has a negative impact on tax aggressiveness. Different findings were also revealed by the study of Oktaviani et al. (2022), which found that management education had no influence on tax aggressiveness. He believes that non-formal education or socialization is a tax seminar organized by the government for company directors to deepen insights into taxation and minimize the aggressiveness of companies in regulating their tax burden.

5. CONCLUSION

The study examines the relationship between gender, tenure, and financial education backgrounds of independent directors of companies in the basic materials, industrial, consumer cyclical, and consumer noncyclical sectors listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange by taking a sample from the annual reports published by the company during 2019–2021. In addition to the three independent variables above, the researchers added two control variables: size and profitability. The results obtained from the testing of the main independent variables, such as gender, tenure, and financial education background, versus the tax management dependent variables are explained as follows.

1. Gender partially has no significant influence on tax management.
2. Tenure has no significant influence on tax management.
3. Financial education background has a significant positive impact on tax management.

Based on the research results and conclusions that have been presented, there are suggestions that are expected to provide benefits for further research, namely:

1. For further research, it is advised to look for or add other variables that affect corporate tax management, such as investigating the influence of independent directors who have
shares in the company on tax management, adding a COVID pandemic variable with the aim of seeing the trends carried out by the company in carrying out tax management before, during, and after the COVID pandemic, or researching the impact of the Tax Harmonization Act on tax management by looking at the company's trends in conducting tax management prior to and after such laws.

2. The sample used focused only on the sectors of basic materials, industrial, consumer cyclical, and consumer non-cyclical listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2019-2021, so the results of this research cannot be generalized. Further research is therefore expected to use other sectors and may extend the period of research so that the research results obtained are more accurate in describing the situation more clearly.

3. Measurement of the variable financial education background is based only on the content of the analysis in the annual report, so it can cause bias when the education background information is not in the annual report. Further research is expected to use other references and media in conducting content analysis against biodata from an independent director to avoid bias.

REFERENCES


Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 tentang Perseoran Terbatas. (2007).

